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Literature Review 
Christopher Stone, the author of “Should Trees have Standing?", developed most of the 
literature on giving natural objects legal rights. He analyzes many legal effects of this process but 
concludes that, even if this is a reasonable approach to environmental policy, until society has a 
change in values it will not happen. Stone takes this stance based off of Aldo Leopold’s “The 
Land Ethic”, where Leopold develops an ethics which focuses on granting whole ecosystems, as 
individual units, moral value. These two scholars together have penned a majority of the works 
relevant to providing justification for granting natural objects legal personhood. Contemporary 
philosophers, such as Gary Varner and John Baird Callicott, have developed strong theories on 
the moral value of natural objects and ecosystems as individuals. My project will be focusing on 
studying these theories of environmental philosophy and further researching impacts on the 
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American legal system in order to produce a more stable basis for arguing for granting 
ecosystems legal personhood. 
Thesis Statement 
I plan on reviewing the philosophical arguments for and against treating ecosystems as 
moral individuals and as legal persons while examining the larger legal ramifications doing so 
would have on our current legal system. 
Theoretical Framework 
I will be taking a philosophical and legal approach to my thesis. My project will deal 
heavily with environmental ethics and environmental policy. I will be analyzing various popular 
arguments for and against ecosystems’ moral worth and legal rights. 
Project Description 
 In the twenty-first century, the entire world is faced with a serious and unprecedented 
problem: environmental degradation. The earth, to human beings, has been something to claim, 
something to extract resources from. However, this purely economic approach to environmental 
policy has caused the best interests of nature to take a back seat to human gratification.  
 The consequences of such behavior have recently made themselves known, and while 
some refuse to acknowledge the crisis at hand, others are grasping for a way to solve this 
problem. Some legal systems (such as India, New Zealand, and Ohio) have flirted with an 
approach that has failed to be seriously considered by many other countries. This approach grants 
ecosystems (forests, rivers, lakes, etc…) legal personhood. This method transforms what was 
previously solely property into both property and individual legal entities, meaning that these 
pieces of the environment now have the “rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal 
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person” (Hutchinson 2014). This paper serves to review the philosophical arguments for and 
against treating ecosystems as a individuals worthy of moral consideration and legal rights. This 
paper will also describe how an ecosystem with legal personality would behave in the legal 
system. This will consist of comparing and contrasting different theories of moral value and 
ethical treatment, analyzing the current procedures in place to recognize legal entities, critiquing 
the current system of preserving the environment, and offering unique solutions to improve the 
conservation of ecosystems through legal personality. If such a bold legal move proves to be 
untenable, ways to modify the system (or philosophy) in order to yield a legal strategy that is 
more plausible and efficacious will be suggested. Hopefully, by considering this new 
conservation technique we will discover a truly useful way of protecting the environment. 
3
DEDICATION 
I would like to dedicate this thesis project to my mother and stepfather. They have 
supported me in every decision I have made including what I would major in and conduct 
research over. It is due to their overwhelming love, encouragement, and strong work-ethic that I 
had the privilege of attempting a project like this so early on in my undergraduate career. Though 
this work may not be the most profound professional piece I ever write, it is certainly my first, 
and I can think of no two people better to dedicate it to. I truly could never thank them enough.  
4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I would like to thank the Glasscock Center for Humanities Research for their 
generosity, kindness, and support throughout the course of this research; from its beginning to its 
end. 
I would also like to thank my fellow undergraduate researchers in Dr. Radzik’s summer 
seminar. They have encouraged me in my studies, challenged me intellectually, and have 
otherwise enriched my undergraduate experience. I look forward to seeing what other 
contributions they make to the world of academia.  
Thanks also go to Camp Frappier, who have supported me every step of the way. 
Whether it was asking me about my research, showing their support during presentations, or 
providing me a break from school work when necessary. They have genuinely helped shape me 
into the student and person I am today.   
I also have many thanks to give to A&M’s Department of Philosophy, with special thanks 
to Dr. Gary Varner and Dr. Clare Palmer for their instruction in environmental philosophy. I am 
excited to continue my philosophy education at this university with these amazing professors.  
Finally, the biggest thanks go to Dr. Radzik, who has served as a spectacular role model 
for me since before I ever set foot on A&M. It is through her guidance that I have developed a 
deep appreciation for learning and have found a profound love for philosophy. If not for her 
mentorship I may have never strived for the academic and professional success that I do now.  
5
INTRODUCTION 
As the decline of the environment becomes an increasingly serious issue we are presented 
with an opportunity to come up with truly unique and innovative ways to come to its aid. This 
project looks to reevaluating environmental law as we know it by giving ecosystems legal 
personhood. In order to develop a coherent understanding of the tenability of such a proposal we 
need to evaluate the moral status of ecosystems, see how their moral status (or lack of one) 
affects the argument for their legal personality, and, finally, how ecosystems as legal people 
would function in real-world application.  
Moral Status of Ecosystems 
The first step to understanding the moral value of an ecosystem is to observe what kinds 
of moral value exists, and for what reasons certain entities matter more than others from a moral 
standpoint. Once we have a good grasp of what matters and why, we need to dive into ethical 
theories, and see how they consider natural objects and ecosystems as unitary beings. We will 
then explore major concepts of environmental ethics specifically, with a particular focus on 
theories and attitudes about ecosystems. An in depth understanding of value theories in respect to 
ecosystems (and other natural objects in general) will be given before analyzing any possible 
objections to their moral value. Finally, this section will provide its own value theory which will 
be used throughout the remainder of the paper. This section will be finished with a review of 
what things matter morally, why, and what that means for ecosystems per se.  
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How Moral Values are Affected by Ecosystems with Legal Personality  
 Once we have a solid understanding of what things matter from a moral standpoint we 
will observe how giving ecosystems legal personhood would protect those things. It is best to 
take the opportunity at this point to underscore some functional flaws with the current system of 
ensuring the environment’s protection. Once we have raised a reasonable amount of critiques, we 
must establish the moral value of the things an ecosystem’s well-being affects. This will include 
everything from inanimate objects to animals to people of the future. We will articulate a sound 
argument for how giving ecosystems legal personhood preserves those things worth protecting. 
Then we will address and resolve all major objections that typically arise when first hearing 
about this proposal. Hopefully, we will be able to answer these objections and quell most 
practical and moral concerns with respect to allowing ecosystems to become legal entities.  
Legal Functioning of Ecosystems as Legal Persons 
In the final chapter of this thesis we will be analyzing all the major legal-operational 
components of allowing ecosystems to be legal people. This includes things such as the 
requirements to gain legal personhood, the benefits of being an independent legal entity, the 
unique legal status ecosystems would obtain, how this involves different areas of law, how 
ecosystems would be represented in court, what kind of damages an ecosystem could sue for, and 
how this legislative change would affect future policy making. It is the hope that through this 
chapter we can set up a framework that lawmakers or other researchers could utilize, challenge, 
and perfect in order to make this legal theory into a legitimate legal practice. This chapter will be 
written with a particular focus on Christopher Stone’s “Should Tree’s Have Standing”, and will 
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serve to highlight his strongest points while also providing critiques where I believe they were 
necessary and beneficial to the overall concept of giving ecosystems legal personhood.   
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CHAPTER I 
ON THE MORAL VALUE OF ECOSYSTEMS 
What is Moral Value? 
 Before discussing the possible legal rights of natural objects it is important to observe the 
general concept of rights on a much more basic level. There is a clear distinction between having 
a legal right and having a moral right. On one hand, a legal right is a claim recognized and 
enforced by the laws of a particular legal system. Meanwhile, a moral right is a claim that is 
recognized and ought to be respected by moral agents. Moral rights typically do become legal 
rights but that is not always the case. A wife has the moral right not to be cheated on by her 
husband, but she does not have the legal right. If a thing has moral rights then it is a moral 
patient and should/should not be treated a certain way due to its moral status. The law simply 
creates and maintains a list of rules and regulations that help to protect the entities and principles 
we deem important morally or functionally. To create a compelling ethical argument for or 
against giving ecosystems legal personhood it is important to determine if, and if so, why, 
exactly these biotic communities have any value deserving of protection, what kind of value that 
may be, and what kind of protection is appropriate. 
 All philosophical debates over ethics are basically concerned with two separate realms of 
thought: value theories and ethical theories. Value theories are concerned with identifying which 
entities should be morally considered (i.e., who/what can be morally wronged) and what about 
them confers that moral value. Meanwhile, ethical theories offer ways that moral agents — those 
capable of doing right and wrong — ought to treat those things with moral considerability 
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(Coleman, 2012). One of the major tasks of this paper is to discover whether or not natural 
objects (i.e., animals, trees, rivers, lakes, ecosystems, etc…) have any sort of moral value, and, if 
they do, why? If an ecosystem’s moral value can be determined, then we can begin exploring 
environment-inclusive ethical theories, which could lead to better justifications for passing 
legislation in natures favor.  
 It is important to note that, even though many things in the world have moral value, not 
all have the same type of value. Upon reflection, there appears to be a very clear distinction 
between things with instrumental value and those with intrinsic value. Instrumental value is 
given to those things that are valuable because they can be used as a resource for entities with 
intrinsic value. For example, a hammer has instrumental value only insofar as it can be used by 
someone for some purpose. However, were the hammer to break it would be of no use to anyone 
and thus would lose all its worth. Its value is derivative from the value of something else. 
Intrinsic value, on the other hand, isn’t nearly as simple. Broadly, intrinsic value can be 
understood as the value an entity has in itself or as its own end. The term ‘intrinsic value’ is 
usually understood in one of three fashions: non-instrumental, non-relational, or objective 
(O’Neil 1992). Since all three kinds are worthy of lengthy description we will only briefly go 
over each.  
Non-Instrumental Intrinsic Value 
 Intrinsic value is sometimes simply used as a term for any sort of moral value which 
doesn't come from instrumental value. When talking of non-instrumental intrinsic value we are 
essentially saying that an object’s moral value is independent from its use to any other being. If it 
were to be defective in some way it would be of no less value, and would still be owed moral 
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consideration. If an entity has intrinsic value of the non-instrumental sort then there must be 
something unique about that being, apart from its utility, which grants it this special value.  That 
being said, a thing with non-instrumental intrinsic value may have additional value due to its 
utility to others.  
Non-Relational Intrinsic Value 
 Non-relational intrinsic value is also known as Moorean intrinsic value. It claims that the 
value a thing has depends merely on its non-relational/intrinsic properties. A non-relational 
property of an object is one that can be described without reference to any other entities. For 
example, we may value a beautiful mountain range purely for its capacity to create aesthetic 
gratification. Even if that mountain range were the only thing in the world it would still arguably 
have that intrinsic property. However, that isn’t to say that value from relational properties is 
necessarily instrumental. For example, many people value the parts of the Amazon Rainforest 
that have remained untouched by mankind, and wish for them to remain so. The forest’s being 
unsullied serves you or me no purpose (since we cannot extract resources from it), but we still 
grant it value for that relational trait and wish to protect it.  
Objective Intrinsic Value 
 Intrinsic value can be grounded in two ways: subjective or objective. A subjectivist 
believes that all value in the world only exists due to the judgments and attitudes of valuers (i.e. 
human beings). It’s a commitment to say that a world without humans is void of any value. 
Subjective intrinsic value is reason-oriented (reasoning being something only people can do) and 
distinguished from mere tastes and preferences. It is not arbitrary and can be changed through 
educating/persuading the valuers. A thing can be given intrinsic value usually because of its 
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history, beauty, or what is represents (for example personal mementos or religious artifacts). 
However, objective intrinsic value also exists outside the perception of valuers. It is discovered 
rather than given. If one is claiming that a being has objective intrinsic value then they are 
simultaneously asserting that even if people did not exist in the world then that thing would still 
have a moral value worth speaking of.  
 Healthy adult humans are the paradigmatic case of beings with intrinsic value across 
most value theories. When I reference intrinsic value throughout this paper I will be speaking of 
an objective non-instrumental intrinsic value. So, if a human being were to be severely 
handicapped we would consider her of no less value than a perfectly healthy human adult. This is 
because her value comes solely from her existence, and is independent of her utility to others. 
Intrinsic value (in most cases) trumps instrumental value when it comes to ethical dilemmas, and 
is seen as the more “complete” and sought after sort of value. Environmental ethicists today have 
issues developing a cogent argument for the established intrinsic value of natural objects.  
 When it comes to ethical theories, a moral agent can commit a moral offense by harming 
a being with intrinsic value directly or by abusing a thing with instrumental value, which would 
indirectly harm other beings with intrinsic value. If I were a part of a community that shares an 
uninhabited pond as its only source of water, I would clearly do wrong to my fellow creatures by 
draining that pond. However, it could hardly be said that I did anything wrong to the water itself. 
Whether we notice it or not, we routinely assign things intrinsic and instrumental value in our 
day-to-day lives. We tend to agree on the moral value of a majority of things but can deviate 
heavily when it comes to subjects such as fetuses, animals, and the environment. We must first 
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establish whether or not a thing has any kind of value before we can begin attempting to advance 
any theories on how we ought to treat the thing in question. 

Popular Value Theories and Their Relations to Nonhuman Entities  
 In the eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant created a very influential 
theory of value that is still supported by philosophers today. Kant was a rationalist and believed 
that things can be known through reason and not only from our experiences (as opposed to an 
empiricist who believes who can only truly know things we experience). He believes that only 
humans, angels, and God are capable of grasping the moral law, and, due to this, are the only 
active participants in the world of ethics (Kant, 2002). The moral agents in the short list above do 
not derive their moral considerability from their natural feelings but rather from their reason. 
Their unique ability to reason as a means of discovering moral truths is what imbues them with 
moral considerability making them both moral agents and moral patients. A human being can 
identify an ethical dilemma and consequently undergo an internal soliloquy about what course of 
action should be taken — an act in which intellectually inferior creatures cannot partake. 
  According to Kant, every other being (i.e., an animal, plant, or inanimate object) unable 
to reason their way through an ethical dilemma is incapable of both wronging and being wronged 
directly. Under this theory, if I am petting a dog and it randomly bites my hand I may believe the 
dog is untrained, but would not claim that the dog is morally corrupt. I make no moral demands 
of it because I know that any demands I make would be essentially meaningless. On the other 
hand (pun intended), if I were to come across a dog and kick it out of sheer spite, Kant would say 
that I am not acting at all immorally toward the dog. This is because the dog itself is not capable 
of contemplating the justness of what I did, and therefore cannot comprehend that it is being 
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treated unfairly. That being said, Kant would still assert that I have committed some kind of 
moral wrong. I would be in violation of an indirect duty to the dog. Human beings have indirect 
duties to all animals based on our direct duties to other people. By inhumanly treating an animal, 
a human would be nurturing cruelty within themselves, which could then lead to the cruel 
treatment of other human beings (Kant 2007). The underlying belief of this theory is akin to the 
maxim “practice how you perform.” If you treat animals kindly you will treat people kindly.  
 Prominent philosopher Jeremy Bentham has a very different, and just as influential, 
theory of value than Kant, one which extends moral patienthood to many animals. Bentham’s 
consequentialist approach to ethics claimed that there is only one evil and one good in the world: 
pain and pleasure, respectively. He believes that "they govern us in all we do, all we say, in all 
we think,” and determine the “standard of right and wrong” (Bentham 113). The only 
requirement to have moral considerability is sentience — the ability to feel pain and pleasure. 
This theory develops the principle of utility for a hedonistic calculus; an action is only good 
insofar as it causes the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number of individuals. When 
presented with an ethical dilemma a moral agent must add up the amount of pleasure and amount 
of pain one action versus other options will cause and compare them in the aggregate in order to 
determine the rightness or wrongness of her impending action. By this logic, even though the 
kicked dog could not grasp the concept of any unethical treatment, its pain adds to the amount of 
pain present in the world, and so, solely due to its suffering, I, the perpetrator, would have 
directly wronged the dog.  
 Both Kant and Bentham put forth well-thought-out theories on moral value, however, this 
paper does not ascribe to either. The theory of value I will explain later in this essay stands in 
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strong opposition to Kant, while questioning some of Bentham’s basic elements. In Kant’s case, I 
do believe it is true that acting cruelly towards animals can indeed cause like treatment towards 
other humans, but I hardly believe that it is the only, or even the sole, reason to not treat 
nonhuman animals so poorly.  
  To demonstrate this intuition consider that Astrid is the sole voyager on a one-way trip 
through space. The only other living thing in her spaceship is her pet cat. During the journey, 
Astrid becomes bored and decides to use her cat as a dartboard. She flings steel darts into her cat 
causing the cat a conceivably excruciating amount of pain. This example completely sidesteps 
any of Kant’s claims that Astrid is in the wrong since she will never see another human being 
again. Yet, we feel a visceral aversion toward Astrid’s action due to its introducing gratuitous 
pain unto the undeserving and defenseless cat, and thereby, into the world as well (Bernstein 
1998). “Intuition pumps”, as thought experiments are commonly called, are invaluable resources 
when determining the plausibility of arguments in philosophy, and this one clearly shows a flaw 
in Kant’s theory that the ability to reason is the only grounding for moral considerability.  
 Bentham, contrary to Kant, may agree that Astrid is acting morally offensively, but I fear 
he may do so too hastily. While animals do appear to have some intrinsic value, many 
philosophers shy away from the prospect that they have the same worth as humans. If having to 
pick between subjecting an innocent adult human or an innocent field mouse to a life of pain 
most would save the human, and we would likely criticize those who did not. This presents an 
odd sort of dilemma when applying Bentham’s consequentialism. In theory, either option would 
be equally good/bad insofar as both the human and the mouse would be destined to suffer to the 
same degree. However, we seem to be uncomfortable asserting that this is the case and therefore 
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don’t agree that a human’s well-being has the same value to that of a small rodent’s. This 
intuition reveals the notion that (at least in western societies) we strongly believe humans are of a 
special and dominant value. While this assertion may come across as cold and speciesist, I 
believe there is a sound and reasonable argument to be made which supports this claim while still 
preserving the intrinsic value of animals.  
Environmental Ethics and Holism  
 Environmental philosophy, being a relatively new field, has very few refined arguments 
for the intrinsic value of nature. However, there is one theme that keeps recurring throughout the 
discussion on the more status of natural things, holism. Holism stands as the polar opposite of its 
counterpart individualism. Holism is a theory of moral value that claims natural wholes, such as 
ecosystems and species, have intrinsic value of their own. No longer are biotic communities 
merely collections of various objects, but rather a single articulate whole with its own unique set 
of emergent properties, properties which could grant them moral status. This means that things 
such as forests, deserts, lakes, rivers, tundras, etc. are all credited with having moral 
considerability and thus can be wronged directly without ever utilizing the argument that their 
worth comes from serving people (Callicott 1989). Conversely, an individualist would focus on 
the value and rights of each atomistic element of an ecosystem or species, such as the particular 
animals or trees. Between the two, and in the context of this paper, it may well seem that a 
holistic approach to ethics is the perfect solution for developing a coherent argument that 
ecosystems ought to be given legal personhood of their own. In this section, I will be looking at 
the concept of holism, and analyze its interpretations in order to better understand the concept in 
its truest form.   
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 Holism is seriously considered by twentieth-century philosopher Aldo Leopold and has 
since been heavily interpreted and reapplied by environmental philosophers. Leopold’s Sand 
County Almanac, where he developed his Land Ethic, has been highly influential in modern 
philosophy and is considered by many to represent the paradigmatic case for environmental 
ethics. Leopold prefaces his theory with the claim that ethics is an evolving enterprise. He 
believes that society is constantly evolving to grow the boundaries of the things it considers 
morally valuable. Just as has happened with society’s attitudes towards racial minorities and 
women, he asserts that society will naturally grow to recognize the value of those things found in 
nature, such as plants, animals, and other natural entities. In “The Land Ethic” (which is the 
selection I am most concerned with), Leopold transforms humans from the “conqueror of the 
land” to a “plain member and citizen of it” (Leopold 173). This has been interpreted as a 
prescription that we must no longer see ourselves as the highest priority in our ecosystems, and 
should allow ourselves to suffer or benefit insofar as it aids in the pursuit of our biotic 
community’s prosperity. We are neither above nor below the plants, animals, or inanimate objects 
that make up our community, but are simply equal to them. Once moral value has been 
transferred from us to the biotic community Leopold presents to us his original rough ethical 
theory, the Land Ethic: “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold 188). This premise of 
rightness and wrongness follows suit in placing the community above everything else, but is a 
deal-breaker to many due to its potentially disastrous implications for human beings. Leopold’s 
work has many interpreters, but none so well known as John Baird Callicott.  
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 Callicott is one of the many who believe Leopold’s Land Ethic to be the shining example 
for environmental ethics to follow. He is an adamant endorser of holism and believes it is the 
best available route to creating and maintaining effective environmental policy. In addition, 
Callicott is vehemently opposed to individualism in any sense (be it anthropocentrism or animal 
liberationism) because it causes contradictions when used to consider the welfare of a biotic 
community. What is right for one organism is not necessarily best for another, and no one act 
could be good for all the members of a biotic community. Callicott maintains that in some 
instances it is necessary for an individual to suffer as long as their suffering is a requirement for 
the advancement of their biotic community as such. In short, since the interests of an individual 
are subordinated to the interests of the community, there are a lot of acts currently deemed 
morally incomprehensible that would be, not only permissible under the Land Ethic, but 
required. Callicott gives the example that in the face of a population explosion of white-tailed 
deer it may be required of us, in order to protect the local environment, to hunt and kill them 
(Callicott 1980). Callicott glosses over the fact that humans too overpopulate many “local 
environments”, nevertheless many have pointed out that due to this objective statistic the Land 
Ethic would then require us to see to our own destruction up to a certain degree. This is a way of 
living that Callicott believes we will evolve into accepting, and it is exactly due to this line of 
reasoning that many accuse Callicott and the Land Ethic of being ‘ecofacist’ and dismiss the 
theory outright.  
 Callicott has since updated his interpretation of Leopold to say that the Land Ethic is not 
a substitute for our current human ethics, but is instead an “accretion” (Callicott 1989). In this 
revision, Callicott contends that the rules, maxims, duties, etc. of the Land Ethic are second order 
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principles, while all of the moral obligations grounded in our current ethical beliefs (as a society) 
are first order principles (Callicott 1989). If we are to believe that the Land Ethic only adds 
another layer to current ethical theories, then it becomes virtually useless. If in the modern world 
the protection of nature is subordinated to our so called ‘first order' duties then the Land Ethic 
would only be applied in a negligible number of situations. Our second order principles would 
take the backseat to our first order principles so often that the environment would enjoy little to 
no consideration by humans. 
Problems with Holism 
 It should be noted that Leopold presents us with both a value theory and an ethical theory. 
It is the ethical theory I take issue with, but it would be improper to do away with his base claim 
of an ecosystem’s moral value for that reason as well. So we are left with the question: do natural 
wholes have intrinsic value? We may have found flaws in an argument that presupposes the 
value of an ecosystem above all else, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that an ecosystem cannot 
have any intrinsic value at all. However, the Land Ethic aside, I nevertheless still believe that 
holism is a very difficult position to take. Holists have a very heavy burden to shoulder when 
articulating any sound arguments for an ecosystem’s intrinsic value, and they must do this 
without falling prey to several very common and appealing logical fallacies. 
 From the very beginning, holists run into the ontological problem of ecosystems. 
Contrary to popular belief, there is no one agreed-upon definition for an ecosystem in the 
scientific community. There are numerable competing definitions all of which have their own 
merits. The first trial of a holist is to decide whether they wish to take an anti-realist stance (the 
claim that there are no ecosystems that exist outside, and independent of, the human mind) or a 
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realist one (the belief that ecosystems of at least one kind do indeed have independent existence) 
(Garcia and Newman 2016). From there they must decide whether to take a pluralist position or a 
monist one in regards to the existence of different kinds of ecosystems (Garcia and Newman 
2016). Is there just one type of ecosystem or more than one? Defining an entity is imperative 
when trying to ascribe it value and rights, since it has to be understood that the entity itself has a 
welfare of its own, which can be directly benefited or harmed by the actions of others. It would 
be nearly impossible to establish an ethical theory that favors natural wholes when we are unsure 
of where those wholes begin and where they end.  
 Once a holist has confirmed what exactly it is they are arguing for they must (1) identify 
interests that belong to natural wholes as such rather than the interests of the objects that 
constitute them and (2) explain why satisfying those interests should even be considered morally 
good. It is here where we tend to hear arguments that become logically flawed (Newman, Varner, 
and Linquist 2017). 
Reductionist Slippage 
 The reductionist slippage is a direct nod towards task (1). Ecoholists have to be careful 
not to make the claim that what benefits the animals, plants, and other individuals in an 
ecosystem also benefits the ecosystem per se. There must be a clear distinction between things 
that are good or bad for an ecosystem itself and good or bad for its members. As mentioned 
before, no single act can be good for every single member of a biotic community, but where do 
we draw the line when we start to claim that some act is good for the ecosystem? It may be 
tempting to answer this question by adding up the total good and bad that some action brought 
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upon the members of a community and go from there, but this is not truly a holist approach but a 
reductionist one.  
The Appeal to Nature Fallacy 
 The appeal to nature fallacy is committed when moral value is assigned to things found in 
nature simply because they are natural, and is a fallacy commonly made when trying to prove 
(2). Morality cannot be equated with natural characteristics because such a claim does not 
answer why those natural characteristics are good from a moral standpoint. This can be easily 
understood by observing that some things which can be found in the natural world, such as 
pathogens and painfully deadly viruses, are quite clearly not considered of any intrinsic value. 
Perhaps, at best, they are of instrumental value when considering their ability to inhibit massive 
population growth. However, that value is situational and disappears when their is no need for a 
population's culling. Moreover, even if we desire for environments to be in their “natural” states 
it is hard to understand what exactly those are. Some environmentalists judge a state of nature 
without human beings (a.k.a. “pristine”) is itself intrinsically valuable. However, just because 
nature has properties A, B, C, …, N without people around doesn’t necessarily mean that it ought 
to have those properties. We may indeed have a preference for those properties to exist, but there 
is still no explanation put forth explaining why those preferences are moral imperatives.  
The Fallacy of Composition 
 The fallacy of composition is committed when a characteristic in a part of some whole is 
observed and is thereby applied to the whole itself. If I were to weigh the engine in a car and see 
that it is around 500 pounds, I couldn’t logically come to the conclusion that the car itself is also 
around 500 pounds. The ecoholist can easily make this mistake when trying to prove her 
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argument for a natural whole’s intrinsic value. Simply because the animals or plants of an 
ecosystem (or each animal in the case of species) may have intrinsic value, we cannot reason our 
way into claiming that the ecosystem itself has intrinsic value. This is similar to the reductionist 
slippage but goes further by saying that because the members of a community have value then so 
too does the community as one unit. 
The Genetic Fallacy 
 Also called the origin fallacy, the genetic fallacy is seen less often but still often enough 
to be discussed here. In general terms, this fallacy is committed when an event that was required 
in order for a subsequent valuable or disvaluable event to occur is considered itself to be of the 
same value as the thing it caused, simply based on the fact that the first did indeed cause the 
second. For example, if we are to agree that colonizing an indigenous community is a bad thing, 
it is not the case that the mere discovery of said indigenous community by colonizers is itself 
bad. An ecoholist can make this mistake by declaring that a natural whole is necessary to ‘give 
rise’ to its members of intrinsic value, and because of this has its own intrinsic value. This is 
often an overlooked argument because most agree that only individual organisms truly ‘give rise’ 
to other organisms through reproducing, and do not exist merely due to the existence of the 
natural whole they belong to.  
Axiological Anthropocentrism and the Principle of Inclusiveness  
 In light of the flaws of holism, I have decided to adhere to entirely different value and 
ethical theories for the sake of this project. I have found that the best possible answer lies within 
the principle of inclusiveness augmented by axiological anthropocentrism, and practiced through 
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consequentialism. The principle of inclusiveness and axiological anthropocentrism are both 
heavy with a meticulous vocabulary that I feel should be explained thoroughly beforehand.  
 The principle of inclusiveness (as it is named by philosopher Gary Varner) is presented 
by Ralph Barton Perry as the “standard of inclusiveness” and speaks of interests as the things 
that confer moral value onto objects. Since it is a vital term for this principle we should 
distinguish “interests” from needs and desires in order to curb future confusion. Any thing can 
have a need in order for it to be a good thing of its kind. My phone may need to be charged, but 
only because that is a requirement for its proper functioning. If I neglected to charge my phone I 
don’t feel as if I have wronged it, because it is not a thing that can coherently be said to have a 
good of its own (i.e. welfare). Needs don’t imbue a thing with moral value, but entities with 
moral value can have needs. On the other hand, to say that a thing has interests implies that it has 
a welfare of its own. Interests seem to be the properties of sentient organisms exclusively and 
exist to further an individual’s well-being. Since the welfare of any individual matters from a 
moral standpoint, the satisfaction of any interest creates “fundamental moral value” (Varner 77). 
Finally, a desire is a conscious want. A desire always necessitates an interest, but not vice versa. 
It may be in my interest to get a sufficient amount of vitamin D daily, but I don’t really have the 
conscious desire to do so. At the same time, if I have a desire to go into the kitchen and eat all the 
oatmeal cookies my sister just made, then I take an interest in doing so. Satisfying that interests 
still generates value, however, it must be weighed against other interests as well. It is in my 
body’s interest to be properly nourished and eating all those cookies would simultaneously 
dissatisfy that interest. 
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 Now that we have covered the main terms needed to understand the principle of 
inclusiveness we should see what it actually says: 
 The standard of inclusiveness may… be expressed as follows. If an interest M confers   
 value on its object a, and if a second interest N confers value on the same object, the   
 interest M persisting, it follows that a derives augmented value from this fact. Or if a is   
 the object of favorable regard of both M and N, and if either of these interests be    
 withdrawn leaving the other, there will then be a loss of value, although a will still retain   
 value owing to the remaining interest. (Perry 642; qtd. Varner 80) 
In order to apply the principle of inclusiveness in a way that makes it wholly unobjectionable we 
must assume (as Varner suggests) two things: 
 (A1) The satisfaction of any interest is, considered in and of itself, a good thing (and the   
 dissatisfaction of any interest is, in and of itself, a bad thing), and 
 (A2) Only the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of interests matters from the moral point of   
 view (Varner 84). 
For the purposes of this paper, we will grant both these assumptions. 
 Despite what the principle of inclusiveness claims, it is apparent to us that not all interests 
are of equal value. However, it is very difficult to assign set values to the satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction of every interest. Consider interests A, B, and C. Interests A and B are of trivial 
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value (akin to my desire of taking only an even numbers of steps in each floor tile), and interest 
C is of objectively high value (such as your interest in breathing enough oxygen to live). 
Obviously the satisfaction of C is of much more importance than the satisfaction of both A and B 
combined. Moreover, this conclusion would ring true even if A and B were added together with 
an infinite number of trivial interests. Interests appear not to have the ability of being assigned 
finite value, because (if that were the case) eventually the trifling desires of all the bored walkers 
in the world would eventually trump your single interest in breathing. This must mean that there 
are different kinds of interests, but Perry doesn’t take steps in helping us identify them. Without a 
way of determining which interests are more important Perry’s principle of inclusiveness leads 
us to many ethical stalemates when facing cases where two competing interests cannot both be 
satisfied.  
 This is where Varner’s axiological anthropocentrism steps in. Axiological 
anthropocentrism introduces new terms in order to craft the following premises: 
(P2’) Generally speaking, the satisfaction of ground projects is more important than the 
satisfaction of non-categorical desires. 
And the following assumption: 
(A3) Generally speaking, ensuring the satisfaction of interests from similar levels in 
similar hierarchies of different individuals creates similar amounts of value, and the 
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dooming of interests from similar levels in similar hierarchies of different individuals 
creates similar levels of disvalue (Varner 90). 
 As one can see, axiological anthropocentrism introduces a few more terms that need 
explaining. Interests are essentially broken down into three different types: categorical, 
noncategorical, and basic (Varner 2002). Categorical desires are best described as those things 
that we believe make life worth living. They tend to require quite some time to satisfy and at 
least some kind of sophisticated cognitive ability to form. Some examples of categorical desires 
would be having a successful career, finding a loving relationship, having a family and kids, and 
being in great physical and mental shape among other things. The satisfaction of the interests that 
these desires create is of much higher importance than the satisfaction of noncategorical desires. 
Noncategorical desires are those inconsequential desires that, if left unsatisfied, are not 
considered to have any impact on our outlook on life. They are typically short term in nature and 
are had by higher-level mammals as we know them. As I mentioned before, I may have a desire 
to eat those cookies my sister made, but if for some reason I am unable to then I won’t think that 
life is any less worth living. Finally, basic interests are not necessarily desires, but are those 
things whose satisfaction is required for other interests to be consequentially created and 
completed. They are typically found in vital biological functions (so there are basic interests for 
the heart to beat, the lungs to work, for the brain to be healthy, etc.), but not all biological 
functions are basic interests (for example, your eyes’ ability to take in sensory information is a 
biological function, but not a basic interest since being blind will not itself kill you). All animals 
have some basic interests as they do not require consciousness in order to be satisfied. Due to 
26
these characteristics, the satisfaction of basic interests does not create value itself. They are not 
categorical, because a life where only basic interests are met (e.g. a permanently brain-dead 
patient) would not be said to be a meaningful life at all (Varner 2002).   
 Ground projects are the key to axiological anthropocentrism. Ground projects are the 
cumulation of all the categorical and noncategorical desires that a human being has, and their 
satisfaction is considered to create the highest value of all. They are built on basic interests, 
consist of many categorical desires, and contain an innumerable amount of noncategorical ones. 
Essentially everything a human life consists of. Some may worry the claim that the satisfaction 
of ground projects yields the highest amount of value is speciest since it automatically places 
human lives above all other ones. However, this assertion isn’t a presupposition of a human 
beings moral importance, it is merely a matter of fact that no species other than humans currently 
has the cognitive sophistication to create them. Axiological anthropocentrism is distinguished 
from valuational/typical anthropocentrism due to the fact that it holds that a human’s cognitive 
capacity is what gives her more-developed interests higher value than the usual interests of non-
human organisms. It is anthropocentric only insofar as it happens to favor human beings, and not 
because being a homo sapien is a requirement for the highest consideration.  
 With Varner’s addition of a new hierarchy of interests, the principle of inclusiveness 
becomes applicable to a greater number of ethical dilemmas where humans are involved. By 
distinguishing between the value that is created from the satisfaction of different kinds of 
interests we are better able to deduce how moral agents are to act. 
 (A3) in conjunction with (P2’) provides us with a similar notion as the original principle 
of inclusiveness. It maintains that between two desires, this time as long as they are of the same 
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kind, there is still no way to assign one more value than the other. The principle of inclusivness 
modified by axiological anthropocentrism is different in the sense that between competing 
desires of different castes we now have a prima facie case for acting in favor of the more 
valuable one. It may not provide the answers for all cases but does offer a course of action for 
most. Say there were rats carrying potentially dangerous diseases living in your house we now 
have a prima facie reason to kill the rats and doom their interests rather than allowing them to 
doom a single ground project. Now we have readily identified the different kinds of interests and 
can explain why it is that a high number of noncategorical desires still cannot demand the 
destruction of a ground project for their satisfaction. The two kinds are incomparable (Varner 
2002). This realization makes the principle of inclusivness much more functional, and makes the 
moral weight of our interactions with ecosystems a bit more clear (as I will explain in depth in 
the next chapter). 
 Axiological anthropocentrism answers my qualms about Bentham and his sentience 
criterion for moral considerability by still allowing for people to maintain their superior moral 
status to lesser animals without making any reference to a person’s mere ‘humanness.’ In the real 
world, almost all our decisions involving animals and the environment affect humans directly. 
Some radical environmental philosophies are seen as the only legitimate way to have people 
respect nature the ‘proper’ way. The principal of inclusivness with axiological anthropocentrism, 
however, allows for us to not make any rash claims that there is a duty to protect all the interests 
of all animals at all times, but still makes it the case that they ought to be taken into consideration 
from a moral standpoint. We have established that holism is not the best argument when trying to 
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give natural wholes moral value, but with this new approach I feel it is still quite possible to 
make the case for granting ecosystems legal personhood. 
 In summary, even though we will be dealing with ecosystems for the remainder of this 
paper, we have established that they themselves do not count morally  This comes majorly from 
a confusion on their existence, and a failure to explain what is good for them per se. Ecosystems, 
once a concrete definition forth arises in the literature, could prove to be of remarkably high 
instrumental value.  Although I could not establish intrinsic value for ecosystems this paper did 
serve to illustrate which entities have intrinsic value. It is the findings of this thesis that animals 
and people are the only things with objective non-instrumental intrinsic value  Their intrinsic 
value is grounded in their capacity to have desires and form interests  Humans, however, are 
objectively more valuable due to their ability to form ground projects. All of this information will 






APPLICATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO GRANTING ECOSYSTEMS 
LEGAL PERSONHOOD 
	 It may appear odd that since I do not believe in the intrinsic value of ecosystems in and of 
themselves that I think they could (and should) still be given legal personhood. This is because 
up until this point, each time I have spoken of holism I have actually been talking of ethical 
holism (believing that ecosystems should be recognized and treated as singular moral entities). 
There is a holism of another type altogether called practical holism. I currently consider myself a 
practical holist. Practical holism and ethical holism are by no means mutually inclusive.  
Practical holism instead functions under the same logic that grants corporations legal personhood 
without being forced to also recognize their independent moral value. I simply maintain that as a 
matter of expediency we should manage environmental systems as wholes due to their complex 
and fluid nature. As I will soon explain, practical holism will lead to the overall best possible 
good for all the members included in and affected by the well-being of ecosystems.  
On Granting Legal Personhood to Entities with Intrinsic Value 
 Since we have already established what things matter morally in and of themselves it 
seems natural that an argument for giving legal personality to those things specifically would 
follow, (i.e. animals). However, I believe my approach of giving legal rights to ecosystems per se 
instead would be much more efficient and realistic. In any given ecosystem it is quite apparent 
that there are conflicts of interests in nearly every situation. For example, a gazelle’s interest in 
living is upset by the cheetah’s desire to hunt down and consume its prey. However, neither are 
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moral agents and, similar to the vicious dog, we cannot make any moral demands of them. 
Trying to punish or rectify any ‘wrongs’ they have committed would be frivolous and a waste of 
legal resources. Even if we observe instances where humans harm animals many problems would 
still arise. If a deer is hit by a car, how can one offer compensation? Legal entity suing legal 
entity is an aspect of civil law (as opposed to criminal) and there would not be many routes 
available for compensating an animal if it were to die in an accident. In the typical application of 
the Wrongful Death Tort a victim's family is compensate monetarily for their loss. However, it 
would not be reasonable nor productive to expect human defendants to track down and support 
the family of the deer they accidentally hit. Not only would it be insubstantial to protect the 
interests of each and every animal, but it would be additionally difficult to find legal 
representatives willing to bring suits on their behalf. By making granting animals legal 
personhood we additionally face the problem of giving them rights that rival humans. None of 
these problems would occur if we instead use the moral worth of those affected by the wellbeing 
of an ecosystem to grant that ecosystem its own legal powers. 
Why is this Legal Practice Superior to the Current One? 
 Some may argue that the system we currently use to protect the environment is sufficient. 
The federal government has already created the EPA, Department of Interior, and several other 
administrative agencies to protect and promote the preservation of the environment, ecosystems 
are indirectly protected through human legal personhood, and any major damages suffered by the 
environment are not ignored. Unfortunately, though, not all of these arguments are true. 
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Unreliability of the Administrative Agencies and the Federal Government 
  The Environmental Protection Agency was indeed created with the prosperity of humans 
and nature in mind, but, as a part of the executive branch of the federal government, its power 
expands or shrinks in accordance to the political party in office. The resources it can draw from 
are restricted at random intervals, laws put into place by one administration’s EPA are liable to be 
rolled back by the next, and leadership positions within these sort of agencies are not always 
given based off of their merit or intention to protect the environment. States themselves have 
tried to address this problem, but to little effect. Some states sought to overcome these 
inconsistencies by allowing the attorney-general to sue for abatement of pollution in limited 
instances. However, the attorney-generals of these states rarely employ this power, and when 
they do it is diminished by the construction of the courts (Stone 1972). This attempt at a solution 
didn’t change the most debilitating component of the environment’s protection; it still falls under 
public law. Attorney-generals themselves are still political creatures and make decisions based on 
their likelihood of reelection, once again making the environments wellbeing a potentially 
second order priority. By granting ecosystems legal personhood the protection of the 
environment is no longer a part of public law but is now transferred to private law, which makes 
it much more reliable since the ecosystems could defend themselves themselves.  
Motivational Problem of Pursuing Recompense 
   To better illustrate how our current system works consider that there is a factory on the 
bank of a river and downstream are ten farmers who use that river to water their crops. One day 
the factory has an accident due to mismanagement and pollutants pour into the river. These 
pollutants taint the water, kill the wildlife within, causes eutrophication, and otherwise damage 
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the ecosystem that is the river. These damages cause each farmers to all lose say $1,000 worth of 
crops, but the aggregate is $10,000. The only way the river could be restored in an official 
capacity is if those harmed by its destruction (those who have standing) file a lawsuit against the 
factory and seek compensation. Though they may even have a strong case against the factory 
(due to its negligence) the high cost of legal fees may dissuade each individual farmer from 
suing. They may choose to simply absorb the damages suffered and take no legal action, thus the 
damages the river has endured are left unresolved. Leaving the river of little use to wildlife or the 
human community; its poor condition inevitably harming future persons through the absence of 
resources. The environment, as it is today, relies on a very shaky defense derivative of humans’ 
legal personality, but if it were to gain its own then its wellbeing would not be contingent on the 
motivation of humans to take action. Motivation to pursue legal action would become an issue in 
a much narrower number of cases.  
The Time & Space Problem of Damages 
 Lastly, whenever discussing environmental degradation, there is a major epistemic 
problem of damages. Typically, when an ecosystem is being harmed it is in smaller, more subtle 
ways, rather than the large scale scandals we tend to think of. These damages occur frequently 
over large spans of time and over large areas. Though one offense may not be significant, over 
time they become serious problems in the aggregate. However, with our current system, there is 
not an effective procedure in place to combat these smaller infractions in a timely manner. Since 
these damages are dispersed across substantial amounts of space and time they are by no means 
alarming as in their individual instances. However, there is no guaranteed way of knowing 
whether or not these issues will become crises in the future. By granting ecosystems legal 
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personhood and legal representative they are focused on a lot more intently, making finding and 
curing these problems much easier and quicker. This new found power allows one ecosystem to 
collect the fragmented and unrepresented damages it suffers and subsequently present them 
before a court. 
 That being said, axiological anthropocentrism combined with consequentialism does still 
serve as an argument in favor of granting ecosystems legal personhood. I actually believe that 
granting this form of protection onto ecosystems will lead to the satisfying of interests and 
ground projects on many fronts in addition to providing protection to those things we believe 
have instrumental value. In the final section of this chapter, I plan on describing exactly whose 
interests are being protected and how exactly an ecosystem with legal personhood could 
potentially protect them. In the later chapters of my project, I will go into greater detail about 
how an ecosystem’s legal personhood would function in practice, but for now I will simply state 
that an ecosystem with legal personhood is better equipped to be restored, protected, and 
conserved than the ecosystem that is not.  
Protection of Resources  
 I will begin with the protection of the resources of instrumental value to the things of 
intrinsic value that are included in an ecosystem. By no means is this the strongest argument for 
protecting ecosystems, but it is certainly a consideration. If an ecosystem were to be given legal 
personhood then all aspects of it including the plants, animals, and natural objects would be 
supplied with extra protection. Plants, the soil, certain rocks, and rivers are all examples of 
natural objects with instrumental value. Now, just because these things do not have a welfare of 
their own does not mean that we cannot do wrong in our interactions with them. I am asserting 
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that I do not commit a moral offense to a plant directly if I were to needlessly uproot it, but am 
harming all the animals and people that this ecosystem’s welfare affects. Plants are of especially 
high instrumental value, and a plethora of interests can be easily infringed upon by their 
wrongful death or abuse. Plants provide food for all animals (humans included), produce oxygen 
for all creatures, and contribute to the health and sustainability of an ecosystem through means of 
contribution to natural phenomena such as the carbon and water cycles. Similar to the example of 
draining the community's pond at the beginning of this paper, we can commit moral offense to 
others in the ecosystem by harming these entities en masse. If an animal of any sort cannot meet 
its basic interests (which plants and other natural resources greatly assist in satisfying) then their 
remaining interests would consequentially certainly go unsatisfied if those resources are harmed/
destroyed.  
Protection of Animals 
 In addition to an animal's basic interests being satisfied through conservation of the 
ecosystem so too are their remaining interests. An animal of moderate to high intelligence can 
have noncategorical desires that give them value. For example, their desire to sing or dance to 
attract mates or to chase and corner prey in the eventual effort to eat them. Some animals, it 
seems, are at least capable of forming these noncategorical desires and have interests staked in 
the near future, but are still incapable of seeing so far into the future as to develop any 
categorical desires. Nevertheless, it is still better for these noncategorical desires to be satisfied 
rather than unsatisfied. The continued existence of the environment in which they live supplies 
animals with the food, water, mates, and other resources necessary to satisfy their interests. 
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Again, this is not the strongest point to support an ecosystem’s candidacy for legal personhood, 
but since it involves interests to be satisfied it is still worth consideration morally.  
Protection of the Interests of Humans Today  
 The penultimate reason for giving ecosystems legal personhood is because of the effects 
it would have favoring the advancement of the interests of current human beings. All human 
societies depend on the ecological background on which they are built and rely on the services 
provided by natural ecosystems (Newman, Varner, and Linquist 2017). This means that humans 
themselves have at least some interest in inhabiting an ecosystem that can provide services. 
Gretchen Daily defines these ‘ecosystem services’ as “the conditions and processes through 
which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human 
life” (Daily 3). These services that Daily is discussing contain systems vital for any human to 
lead a healthy life such as water purification, air purification, soil fertility, and food production 
among other things. These services ultimately satisfy human interests and are provided only by 
stable functioning environments. The satisfaction I am talking about for humans does not apply 
to just our basic interests alone (though those are very much included). People, especially today, 
have conscious desires for the things nature offers such as clean air and pure water. I have a basic 
interest in breathing air and drinking water for the sake of staying alive, but I also (as most tend 
to as well) have a desire to breathe in clean air and consume pure water for the sake of my 
comfort and overall health. It is worth mentioning that we also have conscious desires whose 
satisfaction destroys ecosystems such as eating beef, fracking for natural gases, mining metallic 
resources for technology, etc. These other desires are really only of the noncategorical type; we 
don’t think life is not worth living without their satisfaction. Meanwhile, the services that I 
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mentioned earlier contribute to either satisfying basic interests or allowing our bodies to exist in 
comfortable states. While the satisfaction of many current ground projects and their atomic parts 
are tied to the wellness of the environment there are a whole other, potentially larger, subset of 
interests that we must concern ourselves with. The ground projects of future generations. 
Protection of the Interests of Future People 
 The moral value of future generations can and should be taken into consideration when 
deciding how to manage our ecosystems today. Consideration for future persons is highly 
contested topic in philosophy, and is worthy of a master’s thesis in and of itself. However, as 
philosopher Joel Feinberg argued, unless a massive and unforeseen change occurs sometimes 
soon there will be humans with the same interests and desires as us living many generations into 
the future (Feinberg 1974). In the real world, it is almost a guaranteed fact that people today will 
reproduce and give rise to future generations. Since we can be so certain of their existence we 
ought to give serious thought to the satisfaction of the future ground projects that will be 
manifested. Even if now it seems like a change to environmental policy would do nothing for our 
present quality of life, it is conceivable (in light of recent data) that in just a couple generations 
our descendants will be at risk of living in infertile and desolate ecosystems. This quality of 
living would be drastically lower than in modern lives since it will conceivably inhibit the 
satisfaction of many ground projects. By empowering ecosystems to defend itself will allow for 
them to be better equipped in ensuring their own sustainability. If ecosystems fail to functional 
and give miserable life to future inhabitants of the world, then a simple consequentialist calculus 
shows that it is a moral imperative for us to make sure that that does not happen. Of course, 
people and animals today will reap many rewards from this arrangement. However, it is mostly 
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in the large amount of future grounds projects at stake that this argument finds its philosophical 
grounding.  
Major Objections to Granting Legal Personhood to Ecosystems 
 Granting ecosystems legal personality is such a huge policy change that inevitably many 
objections would be raised. That being said, I would like to address some of the major ones here 
and provide feedback on how this ethical theory I have offered may solve them.  
The Man on the Mountain 
 As I have been conducting my research I have been repeatedly presented with a certain 
thought experiment which I now believe I can reasonably answer. There is a man who has gone 
hiking on top of a mountain, and after a few days the Park Rangers receive word that the hiker is 
stuck at the top of the mountain with no access to food or water. The only way to save the hiker 
is to drive a vehicle which, upon rescuing the man, will leave a wake of destruction in its path. 
Trees will be uprooted, habitats overturned, and food sources destroyed. What ought the rangers 
to do? If you take a stance similar to an early Calliott you would claim that we should leave the 
man to die, because that would be better than committing such a serious moral offense to the 
ecosystem and its inhabitants. This is, however, a hard pill to swallow for most, and certainly not 
a reality we would ever accept today or even in many years to come. On the other hand, we must 
not outright ignore the damages that will be done to the natural world if the man were to be 
saved. Under the principle of inclusivness with axiological anthropocentrism applied the answer 
actually becomes quite clear. Though there are many moral patients (the hiker, the animals, the 
environment’s resources, other contemporary people, future people) to consider in this scenario, 
and we can in no way do right by all of them. The answer is clear; we should save the hiker. We 
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must remember that the man has a ground project at stake which is under immediate threat. Even 
though many noncategorical desires will be upset in the effort to protect the man’s ground 
project, the disvalue created by their detriment does not outweigh the disvalue that would be 
created by letting the ground project be destroyed. The ecosystem will suffer up to a certain 
extent to save the one person.  
 This being said, the thought experiment should be taken one step further. Now that the 
man is saved we are confronted with a new problem. The ecosystem has been damaged in a very 
serious way. Plants and other resources have been taken away from the ecosystem and therefore 
have taken a toll on the satisfaction of interests of all the beings who relied on them. I believe 
that we ought to replace what was lost to a reasonable degree. Those things of instrumental value 
are replaceable and if restored will rectify the harm brought upon those things with intrinsic 
value in the ecosystem. If trees were torn down new ones should be planted in their place, if 
water was contaminated there should be steps to purify it again, anything reasonably possible to 
help the environment be restored to its previous state should be done. Animals themselves, 
though, are not all replaceable, and, as unfortunate as it may be, if their deaths are required for 
rescuing the hiker then there is a prima facie to allow for them. Though this one instance would 
not conceivable cause enough damage to be a serious threat to all future generations and current 
humans the ecosystem should be replenished for their sake as well. One instance may not be 
detrimental to humans as a race, but in actuality these instances would add up quickly and 
thereby would swiftly become a significant threat to all persons. By mitigating the harmful 
consequences to the ecosystem we help preserve the interests that were set back of animals and 
current humans, and protect the ground projects of future persons.   
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The State of the Ecosystem 
 One rather large objection in all efforts to pass legislation for the conservation and 
restoration of natural entities is what exactly is it we are trying to protect? What state of the 
ecosystem should be the one we are working towards? Some die-hard environmentalists 
advocate for a “pristine” state of nature — one where there is no trace of human intervention —, 
others believe that the environment is for human beings to use and see no problem in it being 
humanized, most fall somewhere in between. It’s hard to pin down exactly which condition of an 
ecosystem is the ‘right’ one, and is not a problem I believe can be solved in the span of this 
paper. However, it is not the goal of giving ecosystems legal personhood to give them a chance 
to return to a primitive state. Not only is this unrealistic (as this would include removing all 
traces of humanity), but it is also unethical. By trying to take the ecosystem back to the way it is 
‘meant’ to be we would be required to cull invasive species (destroying all of their categorical 
desires), remove entire human communities from the ecosystem they inhabit (setting back their 
interests and desires), and do away with man-made inventions which actually support 
environments and aid in the well being of an ecosystem and its inhabitants.  
 In Chapter 7 of Ecudaor’s constitution rights are given to Pacha Mama (Mother Earth) in 
pretty broad strokes. In Article 71 the power to protect the environment in a legal capacity 
doesn’t lie within the ecosystems themselves but instead with the Ecuadorian public with this 
guideline: “[Nature] has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and 
regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes.” I take some 
issues with the assertion this makes, but believe the sentiment is a nice place to begin. As I will 
explain in a little bit, it should not be the case that ecosystems have an absolute right to their 
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existence, functions, or restoration, but the condition of ecosystems we are attempting to achieve 
by giving them their own legal standing is in this spirit. No single state of nature is ideal, but as 
long as the interests and ground projects associated with a certain ecosystem are being preserved 
then that is the condition we should strive for. And we can guarantee the satisfaction of those 
interests by supplying ecosystems with the legal personhood necessary to give them a chance at 
maintaining their existence, life cycles, structures, functions, and evolutionary processes.  
Inhibiting the Advancement of Humanity 
 Since my stance is after all anthropocentric, it must be stated that I do not believe 
ecosystems should be given complete immunity from all human use. This is why I support giving 
ecosystems legal personality rather than making it a law that they cannot be harmed. It is a 
concern that if we employed such an extreme legal tactic then humanity would be prevented 
from doing things which advances itself. If it would be marginally better to use the space an 
ecosystem occupies in order to satisfy more ground projects (say clearing a forest to build some 
super hospital which would benefit the ground projects of modern and future people) then 
axiological anthropocentrism with consequentialism grants us a prima facie case for doing so. 
That is what is important for allowing the human race to prosper, which is the main objective of 
this while endeavor. However, the destruction/drastic ruining of an ecosystem should morally 
only be a last resort. For example, drilling for oil in the arctic should be considered morally 
wrong just in case there is technology present to utilize and further research other methods of 
cleaner energy or less invasive extraction techniques. Unless the need for oil is absolutely urgent 
(i.e. many ground projects and interests would be destroyed without immediate access to oil) the 
arctic should not be so damaged. Giving ecosystems access to rights such as due process would 
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allow their trustees to present evidence, call upon expert testimony, and otherwise defend them in 
an effort to avoid their needless/unjust destruction. This will ultimately serve humankind in the 
best way possible by ensuring the continued satisfaction of the basic interests and ground 
projects of humans today and of humans tomorrow. 
On Anthropocentric Arguments in Support of Nature’s Rights 
 Finally, before moving on to the legal-operational aspects of giving ecosystems legal 
personalities I would like to address the concern of using a somewhat anthropocentric argument 
to help protect the environment. It is the worry that any environmental philosophy based in 
anthropocentrism, in a way, misses the point. To claim that nature should be morally considered 
because of its relationship to human beings overlooks the notion that nature has moral value 
independent from human judgements. Christopher Stone (the biggest advocate for natural objects 
to be legal entities) seems to look down upon anthropocentric arguments for the attribution of 
rights for nature. He states the following: 
 “even where special measures have been taken to conserve them (natural objects)… the   
 dominant motive has been to conserve them for us. For the greatest good of the greatest   
 number of human beings. Conservationists, so far as I am aware are reluctant to maintain   
 otherwise. As the names implies they want to guarantee our consumption and our    
 enjoyment of these other living things. In their own right, natural objects have counted   
 for little, in law as in popular movements…however the rightlessness of the natural   
 environment can and should change.” (Stone 1972) 
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Stone seems to believe that a “for us” argument somehow prevents us from granting 
“rightlessness nature” rights. As I believe I have sufficiently proved, that is not the case. My 
argument is, of course, not an exclusively for us one but still does have components of 
anthropocentrism. This though has not prevented us from developing a coherent and agreeable 
argument for the bestowing of rights onto ecosystems. Stone (as do many others) believe we are 
waiting for some great change in social consciousness before any sort of rights can be ascribed 
onto the environment. I, as I will explain more towards the end go this paper, believe that we 
need to give nature rights in order to cause the change in social consciousness and law that Stone 
is calling for. The principle of inclusivness with axiological anthropocentrism has sufficiently 
proven the moral imperatives of protecting nature, and hopefully we can protect nature by 
allowing for ecosystems to become their own legal entities. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GRANTING ECOSYSTEMS LEGAL 
PERSONHOOD 
Legal Rights and Personality  
 Before diving into the legal-operational aspects of granting ecosystems legal personality 
we should first differentiate between moral rights and legal rights. Moral rights are those things 
that we have been discussing up to this point. When a being is said to have a moral right it is able 
to make a reasonable claim upon some moral actor that preserves the right-holder’s interests. For 
example, you have the moral right to not being betrayed. If you told me a secret in the strictest 
confidence and I proceed to tell anyone who listens because it amuses me, I have offended your 
moral claim of loyalty on me and have committed a moral wrong towards you. An entity 
possesses a legal right, on the other hand, if some public authority is prepared to give at least 
some review to the actions that have offended that right. We all have a legal right to our life. If 
the government were seeking to take that right away, then they must provide evidence and sound 
reasoning before a court that proves it is just for us to lose our right to life. If government 
officials could simply come along and kill whomever they please whenever it pleased them 
(without any punishment), then it cannot be said that we have a legal right to our lives at all. 
Moral rights and legal rights do not always line up, but our moral values are ideally reflected in 
our legal systems and serve as strong arguments in legal theories of what legal rights we should 
have.  
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 When an entity has legal personhood in the eyes of the law they have the capacity to have 
enforceable interests, thereby becoming holders of certain legal rights, and they can take action 
to protect those rights. Before an entity can qualify as a legal person there are five requirements 
that must be met: existence, will, subjective rights, economic interests, and juridical personality 
(Adriano, 2015).  
Existence 
 First, in order to be a legal person, the being in question has to exist in some sense. In 
order to have obligations owed to or by it there must be an entity with the capacity to be party to 
legal relations. Legally speaking, there are two types of persons, natural persons and legal 
persons. The category of ‘natural person’ only extends to real, actual human beings. All human 
beings are, generally, automatically granted legal rights and the ability to have obligations. A 
legal person, however, is declared as such by a governing authority. It lacks a real will of its own. 
It is understood that the legal person is a mind-dependent entity and therefore it does not exist 
outside legal considerations (Adriano 2015). I have already discussed the issues complicating the 
existence of ecosystems and will address this issue further in the next section.  
Will 
  Secondly, a will of the subject has to be present. A will is to be understood as a 
subjective consciousness linked to an ability to make choices. That being said, just because an 
entity technically lacks a will, this does not mean that it cannot be attributed one by the law. 
Typically, we see a phenomenon such as this when dealing with an infant or a capitis deminutio 
(person with diminished mental capacity). Where the person cannot form a will or speak for 
herself a representative steps in and speaks for the subjects interests on her behalf. Additionally, 
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we see wills being ascribed to non-human entities, such as ships, corporations, universities, or 
even sports teams. Texas A&M University, for instance, may engage in contracts with 
construction companies or reach settlements in lawsuits. These arrangements provide things to 
both parties involved, but we cannot physically speak to Texas A&M University to see what it 
itself desires from these agreements. Instead, a single representative speaks in place of the board 
of regents, university staff, and student body collectively. This legal technique is similar to what 
I will propose for ecosystems. This component of being a legal person will be discussed in depth 
in the “Guardianship for Ecosystems” section of this paper.  
Subjective Rights 
 Third, the entity needs to have subjective rights. Subjective rights just rights that are 
allocated to the subject (or person) in question. The content of these rights is defined by “the 
power of the juridical norms which is granted to express or omit certain conduct that ensures the 
judicial protection” (Adriano 376). Essentially, there need to be laws in place which protect the 
legal entity’s interests. When its legal right has been infringed upon there is some authority that 
will see to remedying the damage at the expense of the wrongdoer. Subjective rights are 
essentially official recognition of the legal entity’s individuality by its legal order. For the most 
part, there are already laws in place which protect ecosystems, although these have not yet been 
conceptualized as rights of the ecosystems. The subjective rights of ecosystems will also be 
further explored in the next section of this paper when we discuss the mixing of public and 
private law.  
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Economic Interests 
 Fourth, a legal person has to have economic interests. In many cases when a legal person 
suffers they cannot be fully restored to their previous state through an equitable remedy; the 
damage they suffered is practically irreversible. When this is the case courts will award legal 
remedies (a monetary value equal to the loss suffered). If a legal entity could not be restored with 
the default legal remedies then they would stay injured with no alternative for resoration. This 
would lead to too many unresolved damages in a civil lawsuit making actual compensation 
impossible. Ecosystems have some capacity to be relieved through money alone, but not in every 
instance. There are ways around this one complication which will be addressed and resolved in 
the “Suing for Damages” section of this project.  
Juridical Personality 
 The fifth requirement for legal personhood is juridical personality which is the focus of 
this chapter. It is the last piece in the puzzle needed for ecosystems to become legitimate legal 
persons. Juridical personality allows for the exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations, the 
power to use one’s will before a court of law, and the capacity to have remedies run to the benefit 
of oneself directly. I will be defining juridical personality in terms of Christopher Stone’s three 
major components of “being a holder of legal rights,” with a focus on how it applies to 
ecosystems specifically, redefining them as the three major components of legal personhood:  
 (1) “The thing can institute legal action at its behest” (Stone 11) 
As we have discussed earlier, a major problem with today’s system of protecting the environment 
is that its protection is dependent on the actions of others who have actual legal standing. This 
first component of legal personhood ensures that an ecosystem could seek reparations on its own, 
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whether or not anyone else was also in a position to claim a right to reparations. Recall in the 
earlier example (the factory polluting the river causing farmers downstream to lose their crops), 
the polluted river could now sue the polluting factory itself whether or not the farmers were also 
harmed.  
 (2) “In the determining the granting of legal relief, the court must take injury to it into 
account” (Stone 11) 
With this second aspect the opportunities for an ecosystem to receive redress grows 
tremendously. A whole new world of damages committed against an ecosystem can now be 
presented before a court where they couldn’t before. Carrying on with the earlier example, the 
river not only can seek legal action on its own behalf, but it can now sue for damages committed 
against it (death of flora and fauna, interruption of natural cycles, cost of clean up, etc) instead of 
the economic losses that occurred via the farmers’ lost crops.  
And finally, 
 (3) “Relief must run to the benefit of it” (Stone 11). 
This means that any and all legal or equitable remedies a court awards an ecosystem will be 
poured right back into restoring the ecosystem and building a trust fund for the ecosystem, as 
opposed to paying the farmers back for their lost crops in an attempt to make them whole again.  
All of this benefits the ecosystem itself.   
It is through these three components that it can be said that an entity actually has legal 
personhood, and is therefore a legal person.  
 Why, though, should we consider things with no intrinsic moral value as legal persons? 
The answer is simple and familiar; it is a matter of expediency. We buy into these ‘legal fictions’ 
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because they are easier to work with than the complicated alternatives. Corporations are treated 
as their own people because this legal tactic allows for shareholders to limit the amount of risk 
they personally take when engaging in a new business endeavor. If we chased after the 
individuals who make up a corporation every time a legal issue arises, the legal system would be 
exhausted with numerous law suits. In most of these, it would be difficult to establish clear 
standing. Similarly, boats are treated as people by courts because it is the easiest way to get to the 
owner of the vessel, who is likely outside the jurisdiction of the court while their boat is not. 
Since it is easier to simply go after the ship “judges…shut their eyes to the irrelevant differences 
between a ship and a man…treat the ship as if it were a man for the purpose of defending a libel” 
(Smith 287). The same logic can be extended to the argument for the legal personality of 
ecosystems. Recall practical holism and its similar argument for treating ecosystems as single 
wholes for the sake of efficiency. Since it would be incredibly difficult to seek legal recourse on 
behalf of every animal and person (present and future) injured by the abuse of an ecosystem, we 
should simply deal with the ecosystem itself.  
Mixing Private and Public Law: Dual Personhood 
 The legal structure of corporations offers the most guidance when trying to dissect how to 
grant ecosystems legal personality. Corporations are unique legal constructs in that they have 
dual personhood. As Abigail Hutchinson roughly put it, “[Corporations] are simultaneously 
persons who can own property, but are also property that is owned by shareholders” (Hutchinson 
181). The main point here being that corporations are independent legal entities while 
maintaining their purpose of serving those who comprise it. They are indeed legal people but not 
in the same sense that natural persons are. The differences do not stop at corporations being 
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partially property, but also extends to them lacking some of the rights natural persons have. For 
example, corporations cannot claim the rights that ordinary United States citizens can from the 
Comity Clause in Article IV of the Constitution. This decision comes from Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle when The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that corporations cannot automatically 
claim the rights that apply to its constituents as members of a state. Still, corporations are 
provided some rights such as those found in the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments of the 
Constitution. What I am proposing is for lawmakers to adopt a modified version of this 
arrangement for ecosystems. In this case though the ‘shareholders’ are better understood as land 
owners. Under this new framework, ecosystems could and should still be owned by private 
individuals or state or federal governments, but at the same time be allowed to become their own 
legal entity. They should be both property and person. It is worth noting dual personhood is not 
some new earth-shattering, concept that I am proposing, but is a notion with a legal framework 
already in place; all it needs is a little filling in. As far as which constitutional rights would apply 
to ecosystems, I do not know at this moment. However, just as with many other things in the 
legal history of America, problems will arise and be resolved as time passes on. Many benefits 
would come from letting ecosystems become their own legal beings while still remaining 
property. The biggest of which is the opportunity it provides to create a hybrid of several 
different fields of law and to utilize the best parts of each to allow for maximum protection of an 
ecosystem.  
 Before proceeding to discuss how our legal systems will function around ecosystems as 
legal entities, I would first like to address and resolve the ontological problem of ecosystems 
which I introduced earlier. How are we meant to interact with ecosystems without having a 
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coherent understanding of where they do and don’t exist? By working with practical holism in 
mind we come close to a system similar to what we use now: we set arbitrarily-defined 
boundaries. We should set these boundaries on a piece of land and then say, “All the plants, 
animals, environmental objects, and natural systems within these set boundaries are the 
ecosystem in terms of the law.” My answer isn’t a perfect one (as it does not include all the parts 
of all the ecosystems in the country), but it is certainly an effective one. It would become a very 
un-scientific and imprecise definition for what an ecosystem truly is, but it is as close to 
identifying one as we can presently hope for in law. Take for example the Redwood National and 
State Parks in California. The boundaries for the parks already exist, allowing for the state and 
federal governments to have a coherent grasp of where their parks begin and end. We should 
simply do the same when defining ecosystems in their capacity as legal people. Of course, this 
would not encompass all components that make up the ‘ecosystem’ that the Redwood National 
and State Parks are actually a part of; however, this clarification would cover enough of the 
actual ecosystem in order to effectively deal with the whole. The residual parts still benefit from 
the arrangement. By doing this, we would have actual tangible ecosystems ready to be 
participants in legal endeavors.  
 Outlining ecosystems in this way would not just apply to public parks/land, but to 
privately owned land as well. An ecosystem with legal personhood may happen to be owned by 
one or several individuals. The owners of these lands should still be able to keep, sell, and 
develop their properties as they please, but only as long as they are still consistent with the 
reasonable consideration owned to the ecosystem that constitutes their land. Suppose that 
neighbors X, Y, and Z collectively own ecosystem B. They each have a duty to not cause harm to 
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their section of B, but they may still use their land in any non-destructive way they please 
(unless, of course, they can justify compromising B’s interests in some fair way for some long-
term benefit). If they do happen to cause harm to the ecosystem then the ecosystem itself, as a 
legal person and via a guardian, can sue for damages. Again, the notion that a landowner does 
not have absolute control over their land isn’t completely unprecedented. In the United States' 
modern legal system, owners of properties with wetlands on them are prohibited from dredging 
or filling the wetlands until the owners receive a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. The 
difference here is that the ecosystem can now defend itself without relying on the federal 
government.  
 As of right now, all lands (and ecosystems by extension) in the United States are owned; 
either by citizens, businesses, or by some arm of the government. I want to begin by saying that I 
do NOT believe that this should change, and that ecosystems should own themselves exclusively 
in every sense. However, I do maintain that this system can be reconceived in order to improve 
the defenses ecosystems enjoy. We have already discussed how ecosystems only have limited 
protection because of their dependence on the people who own them to pursue legal action. 
These ‘protections’ mainly fall under public law (any legal engagement where the state is a 
party), more specifically criminal and administrative law. Criminal law and administrative law 
are both chiefly statutory, which makes identifying offenses easier when they occur and provides 
consistent and outlined punishments for courts to dole out in response to those offenses. The 
focus in both of these areas of law is on the offender — how to identify them, how to punish 
them, and how to deter further infarctions — instead of the offended. Since environmental law is 
majorly public law, this simple fact has allowed the environment to suffer in large degrees when 
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injured by outsiders. This all being stated, it would not be fair to assert that these efforts have not 
provided at least some protection to nature. It is quite possible to imagine that the fines and fees 
that governments impose on illegal hunters or the wayward lumberjack does deterred at least 
some harmful behavior from finding its way to ecosystems.  
 Though the public law does offer some protection, there is room for quite a bit of 
improvment. By utilizing dual personhood government agencies and private individuals could 
still take advantage of all the rules and regulations legislative bodies have and will pass in 
attempt to protect the environment. The property side of the ecosystems qualify them to gain 
from these rulings. However, the legal person side of an ecosystem would allow for a whole new 
field of law to come into play, tort law. Tort law is civil or private law (meaning the parties to the 
dispute may both be private legal persons rather than state entities), and it focuses on providing 
remedies for individuals who have been wronged in order to make them whole once more. The 
end ruling of a criminal or administrative case would be similar to serving a sentence or paying a 
fine to society (i.e. the government), meanwhile, the end ruling of a tort law suit would be for the 
tortfeasor paying the injured party back directly. In order to participate in a civil lawsuit one must 
be a legal person and be able to prove that they have standing (that they have been harmed 
directly). It is in these instances that the river from our earlier example could sue the polluting 
factory, a coastline could sue a negligent oil company for an oil spill, or a forest could sue a 
reckless camper who started a forest fire. I believe that, if ecosystems were able to be their own 
legal persons, tort law is where a majority of their protections would stem from. Ecosystems 
could fully recover from the damages inflicted upon them by seeing the remedies for such 
damages running directly to their benefit.  
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 Since this legal tactic would shift environmental law from public to mainly private, the 
responsibility of protecting the environment would shift from the government onto other parties 
(as we will see further in the guardianship section). This frees conservation efforts from the 
political pressures that would usually inhibit them. Currently laws crucial to the protection of a 
particular ecosystem are be passed by the EPA or Department of Interior during one 
administration only to be rolled back in the next. The environment's welfare is greatly affected if 
a president appoints apathetic leaders to these agencies. It is well known by now that the 
environment is in critical condition and its well-being should be of the utmost importance. There 
is little time to waste for allowing environmental protection to continue to be a political football. 
By granting ecosystems legal personhood we eliminate the distractions that are usually provided 
by modern day politics and begin dealing with the real issue, environmental degradation.  
 It seems to be that the dual personhood approach to revolutionizing environmental law is 
one of the best presently available. When ecosystems can be both person and property they can 
be readily identifiable (even if it is in an imperfect way) by society, take action on their own 
accord, and be directly benefited by tort remedies. Additionally, dual personhood preserves the 
norm of owning private land, and keeps environmental preservation from being subject to 
bipartisan conflicts. Most important of all, however, dual personhood will maximize the 
protections offered to ecosystems through the use of criminal, administrative, and civil law.  
Guardianship for Ecosystems  
 In the typical, everyday lawsuit plaintiffs and defendants are both able to represent 
themselves in court without needing another to show up in their place. As we have seen though, 
there are plenty of cases in our modern legal system where a person is either too young, declared 
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de jure incompetent, or otherwise incapable of representing herself in legal matters. In these 
instances the courts search for another who is mentally capable to manage legal affairs and who 
can demonstrate that they have a vested interest in the represented person’s well-being. Once this 
guardian is able to prove these things before the court they are subsequently given the authority 
to manage the incompetent’s legal affairs. Obviously, the fact that someone is unable to speak for 
themselves in a courtroom is hardly an effective argument against their capacity for standing. It 
is through this understanding that we can come to the solution of guardianship for ecosystems. 
Christopher Stone writes, “One ought, I think, to handle the legal problems of natural objects as 
one does the problems of legal incompetents—human beings who have become 
vegetables” (Stone 17). Stone has set forth a very agreeable model for guardianship, and it also 
happens to be the one I think works best in the context of this thesis, except instead of “natural 
objects” I will be analyzing how his theory would best be applied to the new legal understanding 
of ecosystems as I have presented it.  
 The first problem we face when arguing for the guardianship system is determining 
exactly who will be the guardians. Ideally, the guardianship position would be filled by those in 
the community of the ecosystem or someone with the knowledge and resources needed for 
effective representation (e.g. The Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Funds, Natural Resource 
Defense Counsel, etc.). However, the position should also remain apolitical, not something a 
candidate would run for. Stone envisions that if a "friend” of the ecosystem sees it suffering or 
about to suffer from some future operation, then they could apply to the appropriate court for the 
creation of guardianship (Stone 1972). This does not limit the position of guardian to exclusively 
be filled by individual people, but allows for those organizations dedicated to the protection of 
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the environment (with top-notch lawyers and other additional resources) to step in and maintain 
the ecosystem’s well-being. This is similar to the system in place for finding representatives for 
legally incompetent persons, except the pool for potential representatives is remarkably larger, 
allowing for a higher chance of someone to come forward and aid the ecosystem.  
 Once some “friend” has secured the position of guardian they will be endowed with 
certain powers and responsibilities. It is important for the guardian of any ecosystem to have 
rights of visitation, whether the ecosystem is on private or public land, in order to determine the 
condition of the ecosystem and better assess the present issues. If the guardian could find reasons 
for legal action they could then raise the ecosystem’s legal rights and seek action under its name. 
From there the guardian would have the power to seek and hire legal counsel for the ecosystem 
using the ecosystem’s trust fund (if one is yet present). They would then be the ones to reach 
settlements and administer court ordered remedies back into the ecosystems. On top of their 
obligations inside the courtroom, guardians would see to a number of other protective tasks. 
Including (but not limited to) monitoring pollution, representing their ecosystem in legislative/
administrative hearings, and overseeing restoration efforts apart from legal conflicts. These 
duties would not go unrewarded as guardians would be able to claim part of the rewards as 
compensation for their legal services.  
 As with any external representative, there is the potential for conflicts of interests. It is 
not a stretch to believe that businesses may attempt to buy off a guardian in exchange for the 
allowance to develop over some ecosystem. If we are true to the philosophy, the only valid 
reason an ecosystem should be destroyed is if its destruction is a necessary component for some 
greater benefit to humanity. Since this is the case a guardian would have very little space to hide 
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if they were to become corrupted and accept these buy-outs. However, if the guardian were to 
accept such a bribe then that would be basis from removal. There are a host of other reasons that 
a guardian might be substituted or removed by the courts. There are already procedures in place 
to deal with unsuitable representatives for people; these policies can be adopted and adapted for 
ecosystems and their guardians.  
 The guardianship system I have observed is by no means flawless, and can be immensely 
improved upon through the research of future scholars. Some problems that are worth addressing 
are: How much is a guardian allowed to pay themselves? Should there be substantive laws in 
place to control the position of guardian across the board? Who is to oversee the guardian, and 
make sure that they stay true to their intended mission (the Attorney General perhaps)? Is 
guardianship a life-long position? These are just some issues that arise upon contemplation of the 
guardianship system, but they are not detrimental to the idea and are merely points for 
refinement.  
 By implementing a guardianship system that utilizes the framework present in this paper 
we would have secured reliable voices for ecosystems across the nation. Guardians (especially 
those native to the ecosystem’s community) are more apt to have the best interest of the 
ecosystem at heart than current administrative agencies do. Due to this, they will be more willing 
to rely on the power of the courts to enforce the conservation and maintenance of their respective 
ecosystems. Improvements will be seen in many areas if conservation became a duty of a society 
rather than a duty of the federal government. Again, the current guardianship system isn’t 
perfect, but with some more exploration it promises to be quite fruitful.  
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Suing for Damages 
 An ecosystem suing for its own damages (once allowed) would become the most 
effective environmental legal technique for conservation to date. In most cases, when a guardian 
evokes the name of their represented ecosystem it would be either to claim damages from some 
offending party, or to ask for an injunction to prevent future destruction. Any and all legal 
pursuits would have the same base goal, to inhibit environmental degradation. In order to better 
shape an idea of what this would look like in practice we need to discuss several major points: 
where the money for these legal battles would come from, what kind of damages ecosystems 
could seek remedies for, how to handle non-economic loses in an ecosystem, and what the 
situation would look like if ecosystems were the ones being sued.  
 Lawsuits are first and foremost very expensive. Between attorneys’ payments and other 
legal fees the price may soon become too high for a local community to stomach if they were the 
ones being called to foot the bill. However, since this is intended to remain mostly a local 
operation, there must be a way to finance these endeavors without relying on federal stipends or 
on a guardian’s private funds. It is the hope that any established ecosystem would be able to 
create a trust fund under their name, which only the guardian has control over (Stone 1972). This 
fund would be created and replenished through donations from private individuals, part of the 
funds from its contributions to the economy, and with portions of legal winnings. By having a 
private trust fund most of the issues that stem from general treasuries (such as uneven 
distribution) would be avoided altogether. It is also from this fund that a guardian could be paid 
in order to be compensate for her time and efforts in overseeing the ecosystems legal and other 
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protective affairs. This fund allows for the guardian and the members of the ecosystem's 
community to take very small financial risks when attempting to safeguard the environment.  
  Once the proper funds are established then an ecosystem could begin appearing in civil 
courts. It is the intention of civil law to make the plaintiff whole again (i.e. to put them in the 
same position they would have be in had they not be injured). It is the duty of the guardian to 
collect a list of the often minute and dispersed damages that the ecosystem has suffered, make an 
estimate sum of all remaining damages not cognizable, and then present those before the courts. 
The damages that an ecosystem would search for would change in specifics depending on the 
type of ecosystem it is. For example, a forest may sue for the costs of reseeding and cultivating 
lost plant life, purifying contaminated water sources, restocking wildlife, and replacing lost 
profits from ecotourism. Meanwhile, a coral reef would claim the costs of cleaning the water, 
nourishing the coral reef back to health, and restoring the ocean life. Basically, all ecosystems 
would seek compensation for destroyed/damaged plants, animals, and natural cycles and loss 
profits (if it earns any to begin with). Though these solutions may cover most of the damages an 
ecosystem would typically suffer, it leaves out the rather large group of things lost without any 
distinguished economic value. These problems require a unique solution of their own.   
 In most cases, when an ecosystem suffers damages I suggest that we resort to simply 
replacing those things which were lost, whether they have standard market value or not. The 
replaceability of natural objects is typically a controversial topic, but I believe an appropriate 
answer could be found for the purposes of this paper. The technical definition of replaceability 
goes as such:  
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 Suppose that a certain being, X, has on balance an enjoyable life (i.e., a life that overall   
 contains more pleasure than pain, or a positive balance of all things that contribute to the   
 life’s being worth living). Suppose, furthermore, that we can painlessly kill X and   
 replace it with another being, Y, that has an equally enjoyable life. If we replace X by Y,   
 the total amount of utility in the world will remain constant (Sencrez 2011). 
 Though this line of thinking goes against many of our moral intuitions today, it may just 
be a practical legal technique when determining relief for ecosystems. Replaceability is a 
controversial topic mainly because of its claim that there are organisms that are entirely 
replaceable. It is the belief of a few environmental philosophers that self-conscious beings are 
not replaceable while merely conscious ones are. Self-conscious beings are those who have some 
understanding of their future (i.e. people). Due to this they are able to form opinions (desires) 
about how they want their futures to turn out. Killing these beings would cause their desires to go 
permanently dissatisfied. Due to this we have a prima facie reason to believe that it is wrong to 
kill these creatures (Sencrez 2011). Meanwhile, any being that is merely conscious (or not 
conscious at all) cannot anticipate the future, and, therefore, cannot set any future goals. As long 
as they did not suffer during their death, their replacement is completely okay, because no desires 
have been disappointed in the moment of death. In other words, all non-human organisms are 
replaceable. 
 I’m suggesting that we take this odd moral sentiment and convert it into a worthwhile 
legal one. If all plants and animals are replaceable then so are the ones without economic value. 
In other words, there is something about them worth replacing. If a defendant has caused the 
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destruction of some section of an ecosystem then their first course of action should be to replace 
it wholesale. Say a defendant caused the deaths of so many economically useless water fowl, 
then they can be sued for the cost of nourishing the remaining and promoting their repopulation. 
Similarly, if a defendant has caused the leveling of a number of trees, then they would be sued 
for the cost of replanting the same number of the same type of trees somewhere else. The 
restoration of the environment is the intent of nearly every ecosystem lawsuit, and all forms of 
remedies should reflect this. Replaceability may be an unsound moral theory, but it is the best 
solution to seeking damages for the loss of natural objects when possible. Of course, in many 
instances when the natural objects do not have market value and cannot be simply replaced we 
require another course of action. This, though, is not a legal issue unique to this paper.  
 I suggest we handle those situations much how we handle other cases when legal 
remedies won’t suffice. Many times calculating the damages is difficult because it is not just 
simple reflection of economic factors. In lawsuits where the plaintiff has unjustly lost some 
appendage or loved one rough estimates are made to decide how much money she is due. We do 
this not because we see the market value of her pain as some objective fact, but because it is 
better to do this than just ignoring it altogether. In those occasions where nothing can truly fix the 
ecosystem we should make the same rough estimates. It is better to take any and all losses into 
account in some way than to just let them slip by.  
 As we understand legal personhood now, if you have the capacity to sue you also have 
the capacity to be sued. This stems from our implicit and explicit duties to others which we carry 
around with us everywhere we go. I have a duty of reasonable care whenever I'm out in public 
(whether I know it or not), which prevents me from acting recklessly and endangering others. 
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Corporations have a plethora of duties instituted to ensure the safety of the public (e.x. 
thoroughly inspecting goods before distribution). Civil lawsuits arise when these duties are 
neglected resulting in the harm of another. As I mentioned before, it is a characteristic of legal 
personhood to have obligations. This is usually understood as the ability to have obligations 
made to you and from you. However, I believe that an ecosystem is of a unique status which 
should allow them to be immune from being sued. Stone entertained the thought of suing an 
ecosystem if, by some natural disaster, it were to cause harm to a human. The idea was never 
fully developed and has some flaws at face value. To me, it seems odd that the owner of lake 
front property could sue the lake if it were to flood and destroy his dock/boat. It cannot 
coherently be said that ‘the lake’ destroyed the man's property. First off, the will an ecosystem is 
ascribed by the court does not extend to acts outside of the courtroom. It cannot conspire against 
another nor carry out actions ignorant of the harm they may bring. Though it is true that 
corporations lack wills too, they can still be held to a 'reasonable person' standard for their 
actions. This is because the actions a corporation performs are driven by a will, be it the 
collective will of the shareholders. This is the main difference from the legal personhood that 
ecosystems and a corporations have. No human could reasonably make a claim upon the lake for 
it to respect their property, like they could a corporation, and therefore no obligation can be 
formed on the ecosystem. Not to mention that there is yet another ontological problem of natural 
disasters (is a storm really a part of the ecosystem? Even in its legally defined way?). This isn't to 
say that the ecosystem doesn’t have any duties to us; it simply has duties that it cannot, by its 
very nature, fail to meet. It could be said that an ecosystem works to keep humanity healthy. 
They provide clean air, purified water, fertile soil, and many other things required for humans to 
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lead comfortable, happy lives. Since ecosystems provide so many benefits for human beings, it 
does not require any additional demands to be made from it. The only reason an ecosystem could 
be sued for ignoring its duties if it were to magically develop an actual will, and willingly cease 
to stop being productive for life. Then, maybe, it could be dragged to court. By observing this, 
we can establish that obligations are still indeed present to qualify ecosystems for legal 
personhood. However, these obligations are of such a special class that it prevents ecosystems 
from being the object of frivolous and confusing lawsuits. Despite my claims in this section, I am 
aware that I could be ignorant of some pertinent legal facts, and understand that it could very 
well be the case that suing ecosystems make sense. This is a topic I would be interested in seeing 
researched further.   
Effects on Social Consciousness and Policy Making 
 The basis for granting ecosystems legal personhood is so they can gain the ability to 
defend themselves when faced with unjust treatment, and the basis for that is to inhibit and 
reverse the global trend of environmental deterioration. Allowing pieces of nature to become 
legal entities may sound outlandish at first but that is probably because it is still a very new 
concept. This thesis, though, has not been the first to explore the representation of the 
environment in legal affairs. In fact, on November 17th, 1971, it came up in the Supreme Court’s 
dissents over Sierra Club v. Morton. 
 In the early 1970s Walt Disney Enterprises sought to construct a ski resort in an 
undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest, Mineral King. The size of the ski resort was so 
massive that the proposed project required a new highway as well as high voltage power lines to 
be constructed through the forest. Due to the massive environmental implications the Sierra Club 
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filled for permanent and temporary injunctions to prevent Disney from receiving the appropriate 
permits to develop this land. The justices of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
however, overturned the injunctions upon appeal. Their reasoning being that the Sierra Club 
lacked standing to pursue legal action, for they themselves were not harmed directly by the 
development of Mineral King. The case eventually found its way to the U.S. Supreme Court 
where the Ninth Circuit’s decision was upheld on the same grounds.  
 The theory that ecosystems/nature should be capable of having their own standing had 
not been presented during the arguments. However, Justice Douglas found this case to serve as 
the perfect opportunity to write about it anyway. His dissent was such: 
 “The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we  
 fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal   
 agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to despoiled,    
 defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public   
 outage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium   
 should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own   
 preservation… this suit would therefore be more properly labeled as Mineral King v.   
 Morton” (Sierra Club v. Morton) 
Moreover, Douglas had the support of two other justices on the Supreme Court: Justice Brennan 
and Justice Blackmun. After the decision for Sierra Club v Morton had been handed down, three 
out of the nine sitting judges had expressed their support for something similar to ecosystems 
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gaining legal personhood, two had decided to refrain from commenting, and the final four had 
not reached the same conclusion only because the argument was never technically brought up.   
 It is evident that the concept of granting ecosystems legal personhood is at least 
somewhat viable for even some of the greatest legal minds in the country once believed in 
something similar. Each proposal to grant legal rights to a new entity will always be astonishing 
at first. This is because a right-less thing is going to be perceived as right-less until there is a 
movement for its empowerment. A thing will be valued for itself once it can be seen as 
something with value. Such was the case with women and people of color. African-Americans 
were once seen by the South as objects that were needed for the economy, not as real human 
beings. Once they were recognized as something more than slaves, people, laws were passed in 
their favor, and they gained more recognition and respect as time went on. Passing legislation 
legitimizing their legal rights forced society to, with time, fully realize their importance. What 
was then seen by some as a legal fiction is seen today as a legal and moral fact.  
 Granting ecosystems legal personhood is simply the next natural step to our constantly 
evolving legal system. Once ecosystems are respected as legal entities law makers will be forced 
to consider their welfare when forming policies that affect the environment, even if it is only in 
those small ways that will eventually begin to add up. Humans and businesses will be more 
cautious when interacting with the environment in potentially detrimental ways. Ecosystems 
defending themselves in a courtroom may seem outrageous at first, but it is a proposal with valid 
philosophical, legal, and real world underpinnings supporting its full weight. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has looked into all the major considerations of granting ecosystems legal 
personhood. We did so by first looking for a value theory which helped to outline which things 
we should concern ourselves with protecting, and then reviewing how this value theory applied 
to ecosystems as unitary beings. Then we related the philosophy to the legal practice by 
observing how exactly those things worth protecting were provided protection. Objections were 
raised to the current legal system and objections were answered in respect to the proposed legal 
system of this paper. Lastly, we detailed how ecosystems as legal entities would function in and 
outside of courtrooms. Throughout the course of this paper several things were discovered.  
First, when considering the philosophical grounding for this thesis we discovered that 
ecosystems themselves don’t matter morally. In fact, they don’t even exist in a universally 
understood way. This prevented us from making the easy argument that since ecosystems 
themselves matter then they should be given legal rights. However, we did discover that all the 
things that constitute or will be affected by an ‘ecosystem’ do matter in some capacity. A cogent 
value was found through the principle of inclusivness and axiological anthropocentrism. With 
this hybrid theory we were able to establish that all animals are morally valuable, but the ground 
projects of humans just so happen to be more important to satisfy than the non-categorical 
desires of animals. We were able to avoid the philosophical problems of ethical holism by 
adopting practical holism and using the interests of an ecosystem’s members as a way to support 
an argument for an ecosystem’s legal personality.  
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Second, when relating the philosophy to the practice of granting ecosystems legal 
personhood it was discovered that there are indeed many problems with today’s system of 
protecting the environment. This included an ecosystem’s lack of standing when suffering 
damages, the polarizing political conflicts over environmental conservation, the motivational 
problems of suing on behalf of an ecosystem when a third party has standing, and the time and 
space problem of damages. We were then able to see how providing ecosystems with legal 
personhood protected the resources and animals of an ecosystem, while also preserving the 
interests of those people today and of the future.  
In the final chapter of this paper we were able to observe how ecosystems as legal people 
would work in theory. First and foremost, we were able to give body to ecosystems despite their 
ontological issues. Once that was solidified, we discovered a way to take advantage of the up-
sides of criminal, administrative, and tort law by giving ecosystems the capability of being both 
property and person through dual personhood. A basic outline of how the guardianship of an 
ecosystem would function was given and left room for future inquiries on the matter. Lastly, we 
observed how recognizing ecosystems as legal people would force society to repeat history and 
start looking at ecosystems (and the whole environment in extension) as something worthy of our 
moral and legal considerations.  
 This thesis in no way claims to answer the hundreds of minute and practical problems 
likely associated with granted ecosystems legal personhood. However, it was the purpose of this 
paper to supply a substantial framework within which the solutions to these issues may be found, 
and I believe it has succeeded in that aspect. All of this was done for one purpose and one 
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purpose only: to discover a more effective way of preserving and restoring the environment in 
these real, critical times. 
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